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KRIS WERNSTEDT*

Terra Firma or Terra Incognita?
Western Land Use, Hazardous Waste,
and the Devolution of U.S. Federal
Environmental Programs
ABSTRACT
A diverse group of stakeholders has suggested that U.S. federal
environmentalprograms should be integrated more tightly with
local land use planning entities to improve environmentaldecision
making and enhance public involvement. Proponents of this
argument have been particularlyvocal in the western part of the
country. This article uses the example of a Superfund site in
California to examine several difficulties with marrying federal
protection efforts with local land use. Diverse local interests, the
existence of non-local stakeholders, and the absence of strong
statutory languageand adequatefunding all complicate efforts at
local involvement.
I. INTRODUCTION
In an era when devolution of environmental protection responsibilities from the national to more local levels clearly appears on the ascendancy in the United States,' "land use" has been promoted as a means to
link distant federal programs to the concerns of local authorities and
stakeholders. Proponents claim that by taking local land use features into
account in federal environmental programs and using existing local land

* Kris Wernstedt (Ph.D., Comell) is a Fellow in the Quality of the Environment Division
at Resources for the Future (RFF).Since joining RFF in 1990, he has concentrated on hazardous
waste policy, local land use planning as it relates to environmental quality, distributional
aspects of environmental policies, climate change, and water resource planning.
This article draws on previous work, sponsored by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, that I undertook jointly with colleagues Bob Hersh and Kate Probst. Although I have
benefited greatly from my colleagues' expertise and comments on this article, the opinions
expressed here and any errors are mine alone, and should not be linked to the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency or other institutions or individuals.
1. See Monitor Interview, NCSL Environmental Director Melinda Cross:State Legislatures
Press Congress, USEPAfor Room to Innovate, STATE ENVrL. MoNrrOR, July 6,1998, at 19,19-20;

Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R.Macey, Externalitiesand the MatchingPrinciple: The Casefor
Reallocating EnvironmentalRegulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. &POL'Y REV.23,24-25 (1996); John
Pendergrass, You Say You Want a Devolution, ENvT. F., Nov./Dec. 1995, at 8; Richard L.
Revesz, RehabilitatingInterstate Competition:Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationalefor
FederalEnvironmentalRegulation, 67 N.Y.U. L REV.1210,1210-12 (1992).
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use and economic development institutions, the nation's environmental
goals generally can be better met. The purpose of this article is to illustrate
some of the typically ignored complexities of locally-based approaches. In
particular, it describes a case where competing local interests, the existence
of non-local stakeholders whose interests differ from those of local
residents, and weak statutory authority and funding militate against the
unqualified success of such a devolutionary approach.
To some degree, arguments for greater links between local land use
and federal environmental protection reflect the fact that many federal
regulatory programs increasingly find themselves having to confront
knotty local activities affecting environmental quality. Although federal
regulators are looking for creative ways to influence such activities,2 they
traditionally have played a very weak role in regulating more diffuse, nonpoint sources of pollution, due, in part, to statutory limitations.3 In
addition, the call for greater local involvement in federal environmental
decision making also has arisen from the perceived inability of purely
scientific and technical endeavors to adequately frame and answer
environmental questions.4 In this vein, "environmental democracy," which
entails wider involvement by local communities and lay persons and the
introduction of more diverse types of information in the decision making
process for protecting the environment, has received increasing support.'
The set of comparative risk exercises that have been carried out across the
nation over the last ten years exemplifies this approach. 6
Probably the strongest call for greater attention to local land use in
federal environmental programs, however, reflects more fundamental
concerns both about the appropriate locus, extent, and coerciveness of

2. For example, at the time of this writing, federal regulators are considering easing
stormwater controls on local communities that adopt plans to combat urban sprawl. See EPA
May Ease Stonmuter Controls on Areas Embracing "Smart Growth," INSIDE EPA WKLY. REP., Mar.
20,1998, at 1.See Brian J.Pinkowski, FacilitativeGovernment: An Experiment in FederalRestraint,
38 NAT. REsouRcEsJ. 1, 3-4 (1998) for an example of a federal agency promoting a community
solution to groundwater contamination.
3. See generallyJ. CLARENCE DAVIES &JAN MAZUREK, POLLUION CONTROL IN THE UNrrED
STATES: EVALUATING THE SYSTEM (1998). See also David Zaring, Agriculture,NonpointSource
Pollution, and Regulatory Control: The Clean Water Act's Bleak Present and Future,20 HARV.
ENVrL. L. REv. 515,516-18 (1996).
4. See generally ROBERT H. NELSON, Ptsuc LANDS AND PRIVATE RIGHTr: THE FAILURE OF

ScINTIFIc MANAGEMENT (1995).
5. See Environmental Democracy, COMP. RISK BULL, Jan./Feb. 1996, at 1; DEWITr JOHN,
CwIc ENVIRONMENTALISM: ALTERNATIVES TO REGULATION IN STATES AND COMMUNITImS 7
(1994).
6. Since 1989, over 20 states and localities have completed such exercises, another 20 are
underway, and a dozen more are in a planning stage. See ComparativeRisk Project Contacts,
SYNERGY, Jan./Feb. 1998, at 4-5.
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regulation and about the proper role of government versus private markets
in providing environmental protection. Although these concerns are
certainly expressed with conviction throughout the United States, 7 they are
particularly evident in the western part of the country. For example,
western governors recently have adopted a resolution specifically calling
for increased neighborhood solutions to environmental problems,
heightened reliance on market incentives to environmental problems, and
more emphasis on collaboration among stakeholders s On the public versus
private dimension, recently renewed efforts to exert stronger local control
over federally owned western public lands evidences a strong and
apparently growing interest in promoting more decentralized and marketbased control of such properties.9 Perhaps most spectacularly, the U.S.
Endangered Species Acte has become a favorite target of property rights
advocates and those who believe that the Act allows government regulators to run roughshod over private land use prerogatives.
The push for national legislation to temper federal regulatory
oversight with local land use considerations also has appeared in federal
programs that, although perhaps not traditionally perceived as bearing on
western issues, nonetheless may have a significant impact throughout the
western states. This is particularly evident in recent discussions in
Congress to link local land use with cleanups of properties contaminated
with hazardous substances at sites covered under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA or
Superfund)," the federal program that addresses the cleanup of sites
contaminated with hazardous substances."2 In the last several Congresses,

7. For example, an active discussion has emerged in the natural hazards management
community on the tension between centralized and decentralized oversight of land use
practices to limit development in flood- and hurricane-prone areas, and the utility of a shared
governance model based more on cooperation than on a top-down highly prescriptive
regulatory process. See generally PETER J. MAY ET AL, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND
GOVERNANCE (1996); Peter J.May & Raymond J.Burby, Coercive Versus Cooperative Policies:
ComparingIntergovernmentalMandate Performance,15 J.POL'Y ANALYSIS &MGMT. 171 (1996).
8. See Principlesfor Environmental Management in the West, Western Governors' Ass'n
Policy Res. 98-001 (Feb. 24, 1998), reprinted in Western Governors' Adopt New Approach to
Environment Regs, STATE ENVTL. MONITOR, July 6,1998, at 3,4-5.

9. See generally SCOrT LEHMANN, PRIVATIZING PUBLIC LANDS (1995); Robert H. Nelson,
Government as Theatre: Toward a New Paradigmfor the Public Lands, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 335
(1994); TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM (1991).

10. Endangered Species Act of 1973,16 U.S.C. §§ 1531.44 (1994).
11. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation & Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-75 (1994).
12. As of late 1998,1,413 sites have been listed or proposed for listing on the National
Priorities List, the roster of sites that are eligible for Superfund-financed cleanups. See U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECION AGENCY, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE,

PuB. NO. 9320.7-061, SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS: NATIONAL PRIORITIES LIST, PROPOSED RULE
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a diverse set of stakeholders-large corporations responsible for cleanup
at multiple Superfund sites, small businesses or landowners with cleanup
responsibilities at just one property, municipal development and planning
officials, state regulatory agencies, local elected representatives and
residents, environmental justice advocates, and high-level staff within the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) itself-increasingly have
called for setting cleanup standards and selecting remedies at federal
Superfund sites in accordance with the intended future land uses at the
sites and in concert with local communities. This agreement among many
of the parties, at least at the rhetorical level, is remarkable. It contrasts
sharply with the battle lines drawn over much of the rest of Superfund.
Using local land use institutions, such as planning and zoning
commissions, code enforcement, and private property law, to undergird
federal environmental protection efforts in Superfund is not without its
own potential difficulties, however. Such a devolutionary approach faces
a number of potentially vexing problems, perhaps most notably those
associated with ensuring sufficiently broad stakeholder participation,
adequate attention to the regional dimension of environmental problems,
and robust statutory and financial underpinnings. This article uses the
example of an over one hundred square kilometer Superfund site in
California where land use has been tied to cleanup to cast such problems
in greater relief. Two related rationales underlie this approach.
First, mining the experiences of an actual Superfund cleanup adds
a practical concreteness to discussions about the devolutionary model in
the Superfund context, one with clear relevance for western states. The
virtue of an intensive case study approach is that it adds messy, on-theground experiences to what are clearly important, but often idealized or
oversimplified, tradeoffs between federal and local involvement in
Superfund cleanup, monitoring, enforcement, and site redevelopment.
Second, exposing some of the complications of tying federal
environmental protection responsibilities to local land use in Superfund
enhances our understanding of both the firm ground and uncertain terrain
of basing federal environmental protection efforts on local land use considerations in the West. Admittedly, lessons from a Superfund site for the
wider devolutionary context may at first glance appear scant, since Superfund is hardly a "typical" environmental program. Not only does it focus
AND FINAL RULE 4 (1998). More than 200 of these are located in the 11 westernmost states of
the continental United States. See id. at 23. Based on estimates from U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency data on a smaller subset of sites, roughly 40 percent of the non-federal sites

in the West are located in suburban areas, 30 percent in rural areas, and the remainder in
urban areas. For national results, see U.S. ENviRoNME&rAL PROTECnoN AGENCY, OFFICE oF
SouD WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, Pus. No. 9345.1-09-0, SUPERFUND, NFL
CHARACTERIZATION PROJECT. NATIONAL RiSULmTs (1991).
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on the consequences of past rather than present or future actions, thus
ensnaring an unusually wide range of stakeholders subject to regulation,
but it also sets cleanup requirements on a case-specific basis rather than a
uniform national standard.u However, as perhaps the quintessential topdown federal program-a program that historically has had little formal
decision making delegated to the state or local level and little room for
stakeholders to appeal USEPA administrative decisions-it offers a fertile
tableau for examining an evolving model of sharing deliberations among
a wider cast of federal, state, and local stakeholders. Moreover, the
selection of an atypically large Superfund site for study amplifies the
dilemma for devolutionary approaches posed by the balkanized character
of land use planning and management throughout the United States.14
The organization of the article is as follows. Section II provides
extensive background material. This includes both a brief review of the
federal Superfund program, as well as an overview of the rationale for
utilizing land use to guide Superfund cleanup efforts. Section III then
introduces the Fort Ord Superfund site, emphasizing the role that land use
has played in shaping cleanup decisions at that property. This introduction
concentrates on the two major cleanup and development planning players
and their interaction with each other and with the regulatory agencies and
the site owner, the U.S. Army. After this review of Fort Ord, section IV
summarizes the three lessons that the site furnishes vis-a-vis using local
land use institutions and players to implement federal environmental
protection efforts. Finally, section V extends the three lessons of Fort Ord
and Superfund to other federal programs and offers concluding thoughts.
II. BACKGROUND ON SUPERFUND
The federal Superfund law was enacted nearly two decades ago,
largely in response to local and national outrage about contamination at
several notorious sites that many perceived threatened the health of local

13.

See Alfred R. Light, DjA Vu All Over Again?: A Memoir of Superfund Past, NAT.

RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 1995, at 29,32-33. See generally THOMAS W. CHURCH & ROBERT T.
NAKAMURA, CLEANING UP THE MES: IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES IN SUPERFUND (1993).

14. The site chosen for this study offers a rare opportunity to examine a case where high
local economic redevelopment potential, complex intergovernmental dynamics, local land

planning and cleanup institutions, and significant federal environmental protection
obligations all intersect. As Yin and numerous others have often pointed out, a single case
study approach is appropriate when it represents a critical test of theory, is a rare or unique
event, or provides an opportunity to reveal a phenomenon, which has been previously
inaccessible to investigation. See ROBERT K YIN, CASE STUID RESEARCH: DERGN AND METHODS
44 (2d ed. 1994). In this vein, case studies should not be viewed as samples that allow
statistical generalizations or inferences, but rather as an approach more analogous to
experiments that help to expand concepts through "analytic" generalization. See id. at 10.
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communities. Since its inception in 1980, perhaps no other environmental
program in the United States has borne so much criticism for being
inefficient and grossly expensive. The program's detractors can readily
point to data to support their case: as of October 1997, after nearly 18 years
of the Superfund program, cleanups have been completed at only 37
percent of the 1,353 sites that sit on the National Priorities List (NPL), the
roster of sites that are eligible for Superfund-financed cleanups."5 Of the
sites that have been cleaned up, the best estimates of the average cost of
remediation run from $25 million to nearly $30 million dollars per site,
depending on the source of the figures. 6 Efforts to reform the law have
been underway for years, in both Democratic and Republican Congresses
and administrations.
As a backdrop to these reform efforts, many have alleged that
unrealistic future land use assumptions are being made at Superfund sites
(for example, that in the future, individuals will live at a site that currently
hosts an industrial use) and that these assumptions have required costly
stringent cleanups and a high level of protection that the likely use of the
site does not justify. The proverbial child eating contaminated dirt at an
industrial site has become something of a posterboy for parties in the
reauthorization debate who claim that unrealistic land use assumptions
and poor science are "driving" the selection of remedies at Superfund
sites.17 The attention given to land use in Superfund reform efforts also
reflects the fact that the existing language in the statute and in accompany-

15. See U.S. GENERAL AccouNNG OFICE, Pua. NO. GAO/T-RCED-98-74, SUPERFUND:
TIMES TO COMPLETE SITE LISTING AND CLEANUP 2-3 (1998).

16. See KATHERINE N. PROST ET AL, FOOTING THE BILL FOR SUPERPUND CLEANUPS: WHO
PAYS AND How? 41-43 (1995).

17. These criticisms have abated in the Superfund literature in recent years as the
available evidence suggests that this conventional wisdom is not entirely accurate and the
process of remedy selection is more nuanced than many have assumed. See generallyRobert
Hersh & Kris Wernstedt, Land Use, Risk, and Superfund Cleanups: At the Nexus of Policy and
Practice,PUB. WORKS MGMT. & POL'Y, July 1999, at 31; James T. Hamilton & W. Kip viscusi,
How Costly is 'Clean'?An Analysis of the Benefits and Costs of Superfund Site Remediations, 18 J.
POL'Y ANALYSIS& MGMT. 2 (1999); U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFCEOF SOLID
WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, PuB. No. OSWER 9355.0-55, EPA/540/R-95/037, PB95963230, LAND USE DECISIONS IN THE REMEDIAL PROCESS (1995); U.S. ENvIRONMENTAL
PROTECIION AGENCY, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, PUB. NO. OSWER
9355.0-56, EPA/540/R-95/038, PB95-9638231, RELATONSHI OF PRO;ECTED FUn=RE LAND USE

AT COMPLETED SITES TO Posr-RwEDIAL LAND USE (1995); Katherine D.Walker et al.,
Confronting Superfund Mythology: The Case of Risk Assessment and Management, in ANALYZING
SuPERFUND ECONOMICS, SCIENCE, AND LAW 25 (RICHARD L REvESZ & %ICHARD B. STEWART

eds., 1995). However, a perception that most Superfund sites require extremely stringent
cleanups has not died out completely, and some literature in the last five years has continued
to foment ambiguity on this point. See, e.g., Rende Twombly, Urban Uprising, 105 ENVTL.
HEALTH PERSp. 696 (1997).
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ing regulations provides few details about the role that land use should
play in the cleanup process.
To address these shortcomings, critics have suggested that the
Superfund program should move toward making more realistic land use
assumptions, and toward tying cleanup standards and remedies to expected land uses. The major argument put forth to justify this is to increase the
efficiency of cleanups; that is, to decrease net costs, speed cleanups, or
address the most serious risks first. In addition, proponents claim that
tying land use more tightly to cleanups also could improve Superfund in
two other important respects: by facilitating economic development, and
by enhancing local control over cleanups and post-cleanup use. 8
A. Facilitating Economic Development at Superfund Sites through
Land Use
The regulated community and others have often claimed that the
Superfund law has greatly inhibited economic redevelopment of areas
contaminated with hazardous substances by presenting barriers to
potential lenders, developers, or purchasers of such sites. 9 Such barriers
derive from the program's well known retroactive, strict, and joint and
several liability provisions that many believe present a sharp disincentive
for a party to redevelop an NPL site. In short, any party that knowingly
purchases contaminated property can be liable for cleaning up the site to
an undetermined level, even if the entity has not contributed to the
contamination. Moreover, according to many critics, even contaminated
sites that are not on the NPL cower under the shadow of Superfund
liability. This long shadow, of course, has motivated recent efforts to craft

18. For a discussion of these three rationales, see generally Kris Wemstedt et al., Grounding Hazardous Waste Cleanups:A PromisingRemedy?, 16 LAND USE POLY 45,46-48 (1999). See
also, e.g., CLEAN SITES BOARD OF DIREcTORs, A REMEDY FOR SUPERFUND: DESIGNING A BETTER
WAY OF CLEANING UP AMERICA (1994); U.S. GENERAL AccOuNTING OFFIcE, PuB. No. GAO/
RCED-94-144, NUCLEAR CLEANUP: COMPLETION OF STANDARDS AND EFFECITVENESS OF LAND
USE PLANNING ARE UNCERTAIN (1994); U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
PUB. No. OTA-ITE-433, COMING CLEAN: SUPERFUND'S PROBLEMS CAN BE SOLVED 3-27 (1989).
19. See U.S. DEP'T HOUSING & URBAN DEV., OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, THE
EFFECrS OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS AND REGULATION ON URBAN REDEVELOPMENT i (1998);

Charles Bartsch & Richard Munson, RestoringContaminated IndustrialSites, ISSU SCL & TECH.,
Spring 1994, at 74, 74-75; Mark Glaser, Economic and Environmental Repair in the Shadow of
Superfund: Local Government Leadership in BuildingStrategicPartnerships, 8 ECON. DEV. Q. 345
(1994); Rena L Steinzor & Mathew F. Linterer, Local Government and Superfund, 1992 Update:
Who is Paying the Tab?, 24 URB. LAW. 51 (1992).
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federal and state legislation to promote the redevelopment of brownfield
sites.20
Thus, the risk of being placed on the NPL may deter the purchase
and development of a wide range of sites that are, or are thought to be,
contaminated. Linking cleanups to land use, it is argued, would alter the
perceptions that stringent and costly cleanups threaten financially any
party that is exposed to a contaminated site. This would directly improve
the calculated investment return of a prospective developer or purchaser
of a contaminated site, making the site more attractive economically for a
wider range of activities.
B. Enhancing Local Control at Superfund Sites through Land Use
Basing a federal Superfund cleanup on a site's expected land use
should by itself increase local government involvement and influence over
cleanups, since the USEPA likely would define future land use in concert
with local land use institutions. Indeed, language in recent Superfund
reauthorization proposals would require the USEPA to take into account
the views of elected local government officials and the affected community
in its land use assumptions.21 This inclusion of local views is seen as
desirable from a perspective of local participatory democracy, from both
utilitarian and non-utilitarian perspectives.' Not only might such
additional community-based environmental protection yield more efficient
or at least lower cost cleanups, since local players may be more willing to
opt for a less stringent cleanup if that cleanup promotes site development,
increases tax revenues, or helps create jobs, but local governments may be
more accountable, and, therefore, have greater incentives to protect their
citizens' health and local environment. In short, they are credited with
being more in touch with their residents than are distant federal regulators.
In addition, enhancing local control may increase the quantity and quality
of public involvement and decision making in federal programs, a long20. Brownfields, by USEPA's definition, are "abandoned, idled, or under-used industrial
and commercial facilities where expansion or redevelopment is complicated by real or
perceived environmental contamination." U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of
Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Brownfields Glossaryof Terms (last modified Sept. 30,
1997) ihttp://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/glossary.htim.
21. See, e.g., Superfund Acceleration, Fairness, and Efficiency Act, H.R. 2727,105th Cong.
§ 104 (1997).
22. See EPA to Use Superfund to Boost Community-Based Cleanup Projects, INSIDE EPA
SUPERFUND REP., Sept. 30, 1998, at 12. See generally BRUCE A. WILLIAMS & ALBERT R.
MATHENEY, DEMOcRACY, DIALOGUE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: THE CONTESTED

LANGUAGES OF SOCIAL REGULATION (1995); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramidsof Sacrifice: Problems
of Federalism in MandatingState Implementation of National Environmental Policy 86 YALE LJ.
1196 (1977).

Winter 2000]

DEVOLUTION OF U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS

165

standing bone of contention in such programs and a particularly sore point
for critics of Superfund.
The criticisms of the Superfund program and recommendations to
fix its flaws have not fallen on deaf ears, and major efforts by both political
parties to reauthorize and reform the law have materialized in the last
several Congresses. Although the liability provisions of CERCLA have
dominated the discussion in these reform efforts, land use and its role in
cleanup have attracted considerable attention. Since 1994, all major
CERCLA reauthorization proposals have included language that gives land
use more prominence in remedy selection decisions.' In addition, in 1995
the USEPA issued guidance to provide direction on incorporating land use
in remedy selection in current practice. ' Even before issuance of this
guidance, however, land use had already in fact played an important role
in some cleanups such as the Fort Ord Superfund site in California.

III. THE FORT ORD SUPERFUND SITE'
The Fort Ord Superfund site, a former military base that the U.S.
Army closed in 1994, occupies over 11,000 hectares of land in California,
including some 360 hectares of coastal dunes and over five kilometers of
largely undeveloped beachfront (see figure 1). In the mid-1980s, concerns
by the state of California that training activities at a fire drill area on the
then-active Fort Ord Army Reservation might have contaminated soil and
groundwater in the area prompted investigations that led ultimately to the
detection of organic compounds in the groundwater. Subsequently, the
USEPA placed Fort Ord on the national Superfund list in 1990. At roughly

23. See generally MARC K. LANDY Er AL, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY:
ASKING THE WRONG QuESrIONS, FROM NIXON TO CLINTON (1994); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING

OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/RCED-94-156, SUPERFUND: EPA's COMMUNITY RELATIONS EFORTS
COULD BE MORE EFFECTIvE (1994).
24. See H.R. 2727; Superfund Cleanup Acceleration Act of 1997, S. 8,105th Cong. § 402
(1998); Accelerated Cleanup and Environmental Restoration Act of 1995, S. 1285,104th Cong.
§ 403 (1996); Reform of Superfund Act of 1995, H.R. 2500,104th Cong. § 102 (1995); Superfund
Reform Act of 1994, H.R. 4916,103rd Cong. § 501 (1995); Superfund Reform Act of 1994, S.
1834,103rd Cong. § 502 (1995).
25. See Memorandum from Elliot P. Laws, Assistant Administrator, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response to Regional Directors of
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (May 25, 1995) (on file with Environmental
Protection Agency, OSWER) (OSWER Directive No. 9355.7-04, Land Use in the CERCLA
Remedy Selection Process).
26. For further details on the Fort Ord cleanup and redevelopment, see Robert Hersh et
al., Resources for the Future, Linking Land Use and Superfund Cleanups: Uncharted Territory
40, 56-62 (1997); KRIS WERNsrEDT & ROSERT HERSH, RESOURCES FOR THE FuruRE, LAND USE
AND REMEDY SELECTION: EXPERIENCE FROM THE FIELD-THE FORT ORD SITE (1997) (Discussion

Paper No. 97-28, on file with Resources for the Future).
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the same time, the 1991 base closure commission, set up under the Defense
Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1 9 9 0 ,' confirmed a proposal by the
U.S. Secretary of Defense to close Fort Ord (for reasons unrelated to the
contamination).
The base employed roughly 14,000 military personnel and 4,000
civilians prior to its closure. Its economic shadow touched at least eight
neighboring municipalities, several of which, along with Monterey County,
have devised plans to bring a part of the former base into their political and
economic orbit.' Although the contamination significantly shapes the
interaction of stakeholders at the base, the transfer of almost 11,000
hectares of the Fort Ord property has attracted arguably the most interest
from the parties involved in post-closure affairs at Fort Ord. The desire to
soften the local economic impacts of dosing the base certainly has added
urgency to the task of finding viable reuses for the site. A number of
parcels have been or shortly will be transferred by deed or lease to various
municipal and private entities (including golf courses, an airfield, housing
for homeless service providers, and, in the classic irony for those familiar
with Superfund cliches, a child-care center). In addition, several large tracts
have been transferred to state and federal agencies. These include land for
the newly-established California State University at Monterey Bay and for
facilities of the University of California at Santa Cruz; a 2,800 hectare parcel
for the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (with another 3,200 hectares
slated for transfer after unexploded ordnance is cleared); and beachfront
property for a new state park in the State of California Department of Parks
and Recreation system.
The rapid pace of redevelopment at Fort Ord can be explained in
part by statutory provisions governing military base cleanups and
conversions. For example, CERCLA and base closure legislation require
military branches at a Superfund-listed closing military installation to
afford the opportunity to relevant state and local officials to participate in
the planning and selection of remedial actions and to work with a single
designated local redevelopment authority.' In addition, several recent
annual authorization bills have accelerated the cleanup and property
transfer process, as well as provided for the establishment of a restoration

27. Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-510, Division B,
tit. XXIX, pt. B, §§ 2901-10,104 Stat. 1808 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2687 note (1994)
(Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission)).
28. The bulk of Fort Ord lies in unincorporated portions of Monterey County and within
the borders of the cities of Seaside and Marina. Other municipalities in the surrounding area
include Carmel, Sand City, Monterey, Pacific Grove, and Salinas (figure 1).
29. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation &Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9620 (1994); 10 U.S.C. § 2687 note (1994) (Consideration of Economic Needs and
Cooperation with State and Local Authorities in Disposing of Property).
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advisory board at each closing U.S. Department of Defense facility.'
Through these latter advisory boards, local citizens and agencies can
review and provide comments on cleanup activities. In marked contrast to
the local redevelopment authorities that plan for reuse but are to provide
little or no official guidance on cleanups, the restoration advisory boards
are supposed to have a substantive role in cleanup decisions, but little or
no direct or official input on reuse. The fact that the two local reuse and
cleanup groups have legislatively prescribed formal roles at Fort Ord, an
institutional setting that most other federal environmental programs do not
provide, suggests that one may be able to learn something about utilizing
land use to achieve environmental goals by looking more closely at the
local communities and these two entities.
A. Local Communities at Fort Ord
Notwithstanding the seemingly firm statutory base for the restoration advisory board (RAB) at Fort Ord31 and for the designated local redevelopment authority (the Fort Ord Reuse Authority or FORAY), the relatively clear articulation of the responsibilities of the two groups on land use
and cleanup issues belies a process of land use decision making and public
involvement that has progressed in fits and starts, and has been anything
but straightforward. Among the many communities of the Monterey peninsula, substantial disagreement about the future uses of the site has erupted
periodically. These disagreements derive in large part from the different expectations, demographics, and economic alternatives among the surrounding jurisdictions. For instance, the two communities hit hardest by the closure, Marina and Seaside, faced losing one-quarter and one-half, respectively, of their populations as a result of base closure, as well as the economic activity generated by base activities. Not surprisingly, their plans for
reuse initially emphasized much more intensive post-closure development
The diverse population of Seaside (about one-half of whose
population is African American, Asian, or of Hispanic origin, the highest

30. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160 §
2902,107 Stat. 1721; 10 U.S.C. § 2705 (1994).
31. In 1994, the Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board was created by adding public
members to the Fort Ord Technical Review Committee and selecting a public member to cochair the new Board. The Technical Review Committee had consisted of representatives of
federal, state, and local agencies.
32. FORA's governing board consists of three members of the Monterey County Board
of Supervisors, two city council members each from the cities of Marina and Seaside (called
Mayors and Mayors Protein), and one city council member from each of the cities of Cannel,
Del Rey Oaks, Sand City, Monterey, Pacific Grove, and Salinas, plus a number of ex-officio
members. See FORT ORD REUSE AurH., FORT ORv BASE REUSE PLAN (1994).
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proportion in the Monterey peninsula area) has added an additional layer
of complexity to the interactions among the various jurisdictions. More
generally, as figure 2 suggests, the areas immediately adjacent to the
former base, which have borne the immediate brunt of the base closure,
and those east of the former base in Salinas Valley, have a higher proportion of non-whites and Hispanic whites in their population (darker
shading) than areas less impacted by the closure. In addition to the
different ethnic and racial compositions, income varies significantly among
the various communities of the Peninsula as well. According to 1990 U.S.
Bureau of the Census data, Monterey County has an average median
household income of roughly $38,000 per year. However, as figure 3
shows, the areas immediately adjacent to the base generally have a median
annual household income below the county-wide average (darker
shading), while those areas to the southeast of the base and on the west
side of the Monterey Peninsula and the outskirts of Carmel and Monterey
City have a higher median income. These latter communities have been less
vulnerable to the drastic effects of the base's closure, particularly Monterey
City, which has a more diversified economy. They also typically have been
less supportive of intensive development and more supportive of
conservation reuses.
FIGURE 2. NON-WHITES AND HISPANIC WHITES AS PERCENT OF TOTAL
POPULATION IN AREAS SURROUNDING FORT ORD, CALIFORNIA (1990)
Percent Non-White and Hispanic White
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FIGURE 3. HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN AREAS SURROUNDING
FORT ORD, CALIFORNIA (1990)
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The different levels of concern over development prospects among
these communities appear when one looks at voting patterns for Proposition 180, a state-level environmental bill that California residents rejected
in 1994. This bill would have authorized a bond issue for park acquisition
and conservation in the Monterey area and throughout California. Figure
4 shows that opposition to the initiative, which garnered about 46 percent
of the countywide vote, was generally higher (darker shading) in areas
closest to the base and east of it than in more affluent parts of the Peninsula
further to the south and northwest of the city of Monterey (with the
exception of the Carmel area).
These three latter figures bolster the impression gained from ample
anecdotes that the communities surrounding Fort Ord are quite heterogeneous.' Not surprisingly, the multiple publics surrounding the base have

33. Each of the three variables discussed-proportion of population that is non-white or
Hispanic white, median household income, and vote on Proposition 180--show a high degree
of positive spatial autocorrelation; that is, the values of each variable do not appear to be
distributed randomly across space. Using a standard spatial test statistic, Moran's I, one can
reject a null hypothesis of no spatial autocorrelation at the 0.01 level of significance for each
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had quite different views on what reuses of the Fort Ord Superfund site are
appropriate and desirable.' This is an important feature of Fort Ord that
was particularly trenchant in the acrimonious gestation period of reuse
planning before the birth of FORA and the issue of the interim reuse plan.

FIGURE 4. OPPOSITION TO STATE PROPOSITION 180 IN
AREAS SURROUNDING FORT ORD, CALIFORNIA (1994)
Percent Voting No on Prop. 180
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of the three variables tested independently. For a discussion of this test statistic see P.A.
Moran, The Interpretationof StatisticalMaps, 10 J.ROYAL STAT. SOC'Y SERIES B 243 (1948); A.D.
CLIFF & J.K. ORD, SPATIAL AUrOCORRELATION 29-33 (1973).
34. The simple observation that socioeconomic and environmental voting characteristics
do not vary uniformly across the area, but instead tend to be clustered, should not imply that
environmental awareness and support have a direct and predictable relationship with
socioeconomic indicators. In fact, the spatial correlation between household income and
voting on Proposition 180 is only weakly significant. Moreover, a vote in 1995 to build and
finance a dam that would have enhanced the local water supply and allowed more growth
had its strongest support among some higher income communities. See Fax from Election
Department, Monterey County, to Kris Wernstedt, Fellow, Quality of the Environment
Division, Resourcesfor the Future(Dec. 20,1996) (on file with author).
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Conflicts over Future Use at Fort Ord

Although initial regional efforts in the early 1990s to fight against
the closure of Fort Ord were relatively harmonious, once the closure was
determined, wrangling over different visions of appropriate reuse broke
out. In particular, the governments of the cities of Seaside and Marina
fought Monterey County over who would shape development. After
several failed attempts to forge various alliances, Monterey County and the
cities of Marina, Seaside, Del Rey Oaks, Sand City, and Monterey united to
form the Fort Ord Reuse Group in 1992. This group, which did not have
any independent governing authority and relied on approval by consensus
of elected officials, did manage to develop a base reuse plan that it
submitted to the U.S. Army in 1993.' The plan, in many ways a wish list
more than a realistic planning document, envisioned intensive development.37 Negative observers dubbed it "the plan that ate the Monterey
Peninsula;" the U.S. Army called it "unreasonable" and rejected it. '
In response to this shaky attempt at a unified plan, a local
California state senator introduced legislation that ultimately led to the
creation of FORA in 1994. Initially, the Seaside Mayor and City Council
members unanimously opposed this legislation, arguing that it would
lessen the City's ability to control development within its borders.
Ultimately, however, the Mayor and Council agreed to support the
legislation in exchange for altering the bill's voting language to give each
local government more control over redevelopment projects within its own
jurisdiction.3'
Since issuing an initial interim base reuse plan at the end of 1994,0
FORA has been revising its work, developing recommendations for how
to phase reuse, and preparing an environmental impact report for the final
plan, which was issued and approved by the FORA Board in mid-1997.
Relations among its member governments apparently have remained
relatively smooth since its founding. Nonetheless, the plan continues to
attract a modicum of controversy. Several public hearings on the June 1996
draft plan (the hearings technically covered the environmental impact
report that accompanies the plan rather than the plan itself) were held, and

35.

See Chronology Lists Milestones on Road to Enactment, MONTEREY COUNTY HERALD, May

10, 1994, at 10A.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. Id.; Nicole Volpe, In the Rough, COAST WKLY., Nov. 18,1993, at 12.
39. Thorn Akeman, Senate Approves Ord Bill, MONTEREY COUNTY HERALD, May 4,1994,
at 1A; Kevin Howe, McClair Digs Infor On Batte, THE (MONTEREY COUNTY) SUNDAY HERALD,

Mar. 27,1994, at 1A.
40.

See FORT ORD REUSE AUTH., supranote 32.
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a number of individuals continued to express concerns about the impacts
of the proposed development on freshwater resources and infrastructure.
For example, one citizen commented that the development envisioned in
the proposed plan would "damage life on [the Monterey] Peninsula, as we
know it," another characterized it as a "slow motion explosion," and a third
begged that the Peninsula, "one of the few bastions of California life left on
the coast," be left alone."
C. Conflicts over Cleanup at Fort Ord
Although the RAB at Fort Ord has not had such a tortuous past as
FORA, relations within its membership have appeared much more strained
and its effectiveness much more questionable. This is not surprising, for
several reasons.
First, while FORA members are relatively united in their purpose
of getting property transferred for development, the RAB members were
much less homogeneous in their interests. The RAB included representatives of federal, state, and local agencies, conservation proponents,
environmentalists concerned with quality of life issues, and environmental
justice advocates, and, some claim, the group served as a platform for local
politicians running for office. The selection of members from the community to serve on the Board was contentious at times, and a number of
community members either quit in mid-term or were forced to leave the
Board against their will. In addition, while some community members of
the RAB have developed comfortable working relationships with the U.S.
Army, other members were adamant that the U.S. Army and regulatory
agencies shut them and other disenfranchised people out of the cleanup
and reuse process.
Second, because community members volunteered their time on
the RAB, many found it difficult to thoroughly and quickly review
documents, attend meetings, and, more generally, keep up with the agency
representatives on the RAB who received compensation for much of their
time. The Army furnished logistical support (for document copying, for
example) and funded a staff position for RAB work at Ford Ord, but it did
not provide more direct financial support for RAB citizen members and
their activities (to hire an independent technical consultant, for example).
Not surprisingly, several of the most active and vocal community RAB
members in the early years had retirement pensions or other independent
sources of income, and, thus, the flexibility to accommodate the considerable time demanded by Fort Ord cleanup issues.

41.

at IA.

Thorn Akeman, FORA Plan Gets Extnsion, MONTEREY COUNTY HERALD, July 2,1996,
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Third, for some members the separation of cleanup from reuse
planning has muddled the RAB's mission. It is clear from Department of
Defense guidance documents on the establishment of the advisory boards
that the RAB was charged with identifying "applicable standards and
consistent with section 121 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation and Liabilities Act, CERCLA, proposed cleanup levels
consistent with planned land reuse," yet U.S. Army representatives at Ford
Ord have also clearly stated that the actual issue of reuse was not part of
the RAB's agenda.' At the outset, several RAB members suggested that
cleanup decisions should be made in conjunction with reuse decisions. The
U.S. Army opposed the efforts of these members to move the RAB toward
more active participation on reuse matters. Tensions over this surfaced
repeatedly, and were exacerbated by very limited interaction between
FORA and the RAB.' In addition, the U.S. Army seriously considered
dissolving the RAB as early as 1997, following a recommendation from an
outside mediator to suspend operations due to its apparent inability to deal
substantively with cleanup issues. It carried through on this in 1999 by
disbanding the RAB.
IV. LESSONS LEARNED FROM FORT ORD
The success in implementing the federal Superfund cleanup
responsibility through local stakeholders thus has been mixed at Fort Ord.
What emerges from the case study are three overlapping lessons regarding
public involvement in redevelopment and cleanup: the presence of
multiple and heterogeneous interests; the necessity of including supra-local

42. Fort Ord Technical Review Committee, Restoration Advisory Board Meeting, Tr. of
Feb. 7,1994, meeting, at 41, 43 (on file with author).
43. See Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board Meeting, Tr. of Jan. 26,1995, meeting, at 13
(on file with author). When the project coordinator of FORA appeared at an early RAB
meeting and presented the 1994 interim reuse plan, it became painfully obvious that the
contaminated sites that the RAB was interested in were not identified on the FORA reuse
planning map, a likely bureaucratic oversight but one with obvious symbolic importance. See
id.
44. See Letter from Colonel Daniel D. Devlin, U.S. Dep't of the Army, Ofice of the
InstallationCommander, PresidioofMonterey, to Fort Ord Restoration Advisory Board Members
(May 12, 1999) (on file at CPEO Military List Archive) (visited Aug. 3, 1999)
(http://www.cpeo.org/lists/military/1999/msgOO240.html,. See also Letter from Daniel D.
Opalski, Chief, Federal Facilities Branch, U.S. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency, Region 9, to Fort
Ord Restoration Advisory Board members (no date) (on file at CPEO Military List Archive)
(visited August 3,1999) (http://www.cpeo.org/lists/military/1999/msgOO275.html,; Army
MaintainsRAB at Fort Ord, while PressingNew Outreach Plan, INSIDE EPA'S SUPERsuND REP.,
Feb. 4, 1998, at 19; In First Ever Decision, Army May Disband RAB at Fort Ord, INSIDE EPA'S
SUPERFUND REP., Nov. 12,1997, at 18.
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stakeholders; and the need for a clear statutory and regulatory base and
funding to support public involvement. Each of these is relevant for the
broader issue of linking federal environmental programs with local land
use institutions in the western United States.
A. Multiple Local Interests
An obvious if understated difficulty with grounding federal
environmental protection efforts in local land use institutions is the
presence of multiple and often disparate local communities. In the face of
these multiple communities, what is the legitimate local interest for
managing a federal environmental effort? Within Superfund, for instance,
a casual read of the language in a recent reauthorization proposal-to take
into account the views of "the affected community"-is that a single
community belongs at the decision making table.' If taken literally, this
clearly flies in the face of many situations where multiple communities are
affected by Superfund sites. Moreover, even a less damning read of the
precise definition of affected community in two recently proposed
bills-"any group of 2 or more individuals (including representatives of
Indian tribes) which may be affected by a release or threatened release of
a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant at a covered facility"-is
problematic.* Such an interpretation essentially limits community
participation to those residents who are physically connected to the
contamination. By many measures of public interest, this may limit
involvement to a narrow range of interests.
Many types of communities, defined by geographic place, common
identity such as ethnicity, or common interest such as the desire to protect
a natural environment from further development, may have a stake in
environmental outcomes at the local level.47 In principle, this is not
necessarily a fatal flaw for community involvement. Local consensus-based
processes can be quite effective at bringing together different communities
to define a local public interest, as evidenced by a number of success stories
in collaborative local planning of western federal lands.' For such
processes to work, however, stakeholders frequently need to face a realistic
threat of undesirable consequences if local community interests fail to

45. See H.R. 2727,105th Cong. § 202 (1997) (emphasis added).
46. Id. at § 201. The language in this Republican bill is mirrored by Democratic legislative
proposals, for example, H.R. 3262,105th Cong. § 201 (1998).
47. See generallyTimothy P. Duane, Community Participationin Ecosystem Management, 24
ECOLOGY L.Q. 771 (1997).

48. See, e.g., THE NEXT WESr: PUBuC LANDS, COMMUNrY, AND THE ECONOMY INTHE
AMERICAN WEST (JOHN A. BADEN & DONALD SNOW eds., 1997); "'THIs Special Issue Samples

Consensus Efforts across the West," HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, May 13,1996.
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converge. Moreover, as Putnam implies, solidarity, trust, tolerance, political
equality, a sense of reciprocity, and firm historical roots are critical for civic
engagement in such a consensus process." Absent these, institutions to
promote this engagement can only slowly evolve into being, if at all. At
Fort Ord, such traditions were only partly in place. While FORA faced a
credible threat of economic disaster if it could not bring its disparate parts
together, as well as possessed some tradition of civic engagement, the RAB
arguably was neither confronted by an analogous threat nor enjoyed a civic
tradition.
As the often-stark lines for environmental protection potentially
give way to more blurry conditional lines that lend greater emphasis to
local economic and social conditions, some aspects of environmental
protection could easily become more susceptible to negotiation. Indeed,
such negotiation at the local level is the strength of a local, land-use based
process. However, the implications of this for traditionally under-represented publics is troubling. Absent a tradition of civic engagement across
a wide range of interests, and in the face of multiple communities (however
defined), it may be quite difficult to arrive at a decision that represents a
broadly defined local public interest.'
As one moves beyond Superfund-a federal program which
focuses predominantly on protection of human health and the environment
on private properties-to the large number of other federal programs or
agencies that emphasize management of natural resources or environmental goods on western public lands-a broad public interest may become
even more difficult to define. "Public lands management," as James
Huffman reminds us, "is fundamentally about politics. It is about gaining
and losing individual wealth through the political process.""1 In such a
setting, leadership of the local effort becomes critical for ensuring broad
participation in the social interest.
B.

Non-Local and Supra-Local Stakeholders

As suggested in the above point and throughout this discussion,
many of the stakeholders at Fort Ord do not reside in jurisdictions that
immediately abut the former army base. Such non-bordering populations
can either be supra-local, consisting of individuals who reside in the
surrounding region but not immediately adjacent to the site, or completely

49. See generally ROBERT D. PUrNAM, MAKING DEMCRACY WORK: CMC TRADITIONS IN
MODERN ITALY (1993).

50. See LEHMANN, supranote 9, at 190-97.
51. James L.Huffman, The InevitabilityofPrivate Rights in PublicLands, 65 U. COLO.L REV.
241,273(1994).
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non-local, consisting of individuals who live in distant areas. In either case,
despite their immediate separation from Fort Ord, the closure and the postclosure activities at the former base can greatly influence the well being of
the supra-local and non-local populations because the closure and activities
can fundamentally affect their interests and values.
From the standpoint of supra-local populations, bringing land use
and economic development to center stage in environmental programs may
greatly enlarge the spatial locus of decision making. Land use decisions
often yield wider, or at least more obvious, regional impacts than do
narrower, site-specific environmental remediation or protection decisions,
because the economic and social impacts of land use decisions can quickly
extend beyond a site's boundaries. They are not limited by hydrology,
erosion, air deposition, or other physical processes, 2 but instead can be
readily transmitted throughout a region and appear in such forms as taxes,
congestion, economic competition, highway construction, shrinking open
space, and demand for water.
From the standpoint of non-local populations, oftentimes an
environmental decision has regional or national implications, either
because the decision directly affects an environmental resource that a wide
range of non-local stakeholders perceive as a national good,' or because
the decision indirectly shapes decisions about other resources in non-local
areas. At Fort Ord, for example, a conflict with non-local implications exists
over the degree of cleanup required for unexploded ordnance. With over
3.5 million hectares of firing ranges scattered across the United States with
potential unexploded ordnance problems, the U.S. Army and interest
groups are keenly aware of the precedent that the Fort Ord cleanup may
set regarding the authority of Superfund and the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Acte over unexploded ordnance.
In cases where supra-local stakeholders are evident, and where
land use and economic development concerns augur well for the involvement of local and supra-local stakeholders, federal regulators face a
difficult task in devising a public involvement strategy that can accommodate the wide range of interests. It is certainly realistic to extend beyond the
immediately adjacent communities to involve these regional stakeholders.

52. Most texts on devolution and federalism note that the presence of these
environmental spillover impacts across jurisdictional lines justifies a federal role in
environmental protection. See generally DAVID B. WALKER, THE REBIRTH OF FEDERALISM:
SLOUCHING TOWARD WASHITON (1995); AUCE M. RIVLIN, REVIVING THE AMERCAN DREAM:
THE ECONOMY, THE STATES AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 24-25 (1992).

53. See Richard B.Stewart, Environmental Qualityas a National Good ina Federal State, 1997
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 199.
54. Resource Conservation Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92 (1994)).
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FORA, for instance, has worked effectively to draw a regional plan,
notwithstanding its very painful gestation period and somewhat troubled
adolescence. However, given the fragmented nature of land use authority
in the westernUnited States and the decidedly mixed and roller-coaster
record of regional planning and operating entities, one should be less than
sanguine about the prospects for effective and inclusive community control
over environmental decisions when impacts may be experienced at a
regional or metropolitan level.s
Moreover, the record of local, consensus-based approaches for
accommodating non-local stakeholders in federal land use decision making
in the West also is somewhat mixed. These efforts, as represented by such
undertakings as California's Inimin Forest Experiment and Quincy Library
Group, Oregon's Applegate Partnership, and Montana's Blackfoot
Challenge, have had some successes in promoting local control over federal
lands in an inclusive process and, in fact, such practices have been
championed by the President's Council on Sustainable Development.'
However, some of these processes have received extensive criticism for
excluding any involvement by federal resource management agencies and
other non-local stakeholders."r As opined by the chairperson of one
important and highly visible national environmental group in a memo to
his organization's Board of Directors, such community-based stakeholder
collaborative processes may promote a "re-distribution of power" that is
designed to "disempower" the national group's constituency, which is
heavily urban, with no way for distant stakeholders to be "effectively
represented." In general, whether devolution of environmental responsibilities to decentralized decision-makers will promote more rational and
desirable outcomes of environmental protection continues to be actively
debated in the literature."

55. See generallyMYRON ORFIEw, MErROPoLrro: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNnIY
AND STABmUY 125 (1997); RUrHERFRDH. PLArr, LAND UsE CONrRou GEOGRAPHY, LAW, AND

PUBLC PoUcY (1991).
56. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON SUsTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, SUSTAINABLE AMERICA: A
NEW CONSENSUS FOR PROSPERITY, OPPORTUNITY, AND A HEALTHY ENViRONMENT FOR THE

FUTURE ch. 4 (1996).

57. See Duane, supra note 47, at 784-97; Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the
Public Lands: Why 'Multiple Use' Failed,18 HARV. ENVrL L. REV. 405 (1994).
58. See Memorandum from Michael McCloskey to the Board of Directors, Sierra Club
(Nov. 1995) (on file with the Sierra Club), reprinted in The Skeptic: CollaborationHas Its Limits,
HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, May 13,1996, at 5.
59. See generally,Peter P. Swire, The Race to laxity and the Race to Undesirability:Explaining
Failurein Competition among Jurisdictionsin Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 67
(1996); Nelson, supra note 9, at 358-59 (advocates a decentralized decision-making process for
federal land management that is integrally linked to the market system). Stewart provided a
seminal treatment of rationales for federal versus local leads on environmental protection over
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C. Adequate Statutory and Regulatory Bases and Funding
At Fort Ord, land use has been given a prominent role in environmental decision making through various U.S. Department of Defense
authorization bills, the Community Environmental Response Facilitation
Act amendments to CERCLA, base closure legislation, federal property
legislation, the Endangered Species Act, and State of California legislation
that established the local redevelopment authority.' All of these have
helped land use and land use institutions to play some hand in influencing
the environmental concerns under Superfund, and made this influence
more explicit and open.
At the same time, however, the language of the statutes and
regulations has in some cases worked against the smooth interplay of land.
use and environmental objectives. This is best exemplified by the lack of
integration between FORA and the RAB. The two groups have been given
statutory responsibility to guide either reuse or cleanup efforts, but at the
same time seemingly have been prohibited from working at the interface
of these twin processes. Moreover, the legislation and regulations that
underlie the groups appear to have created unequal partners. FORA has
been given the sole authority to develop the reuse plan (subject to U.S.
Army approval) for most of the base, and has managed to rally financial
resources to support its work. The RAB, on the other hand, served
principally as an adviser to the U.S. Army. Implementing regulations did
not provide it with any significant funding, and members of the group
managed to raise only modest financial support from other sources.
Given the Fort Ord experience and in the face of pressure for
linking federal environmental programs with local land use institutions, it
would seem desirable that the interface between land use and environmental protection be clearly established. Even a strong commitment to
incorporating local land use concerns into environmental programs risks

20 years ago. See Stewart, supranote 22. He recently puzzled over the continued dominance
of federal environmental regulations in the face of positivist and normative arguments for
more local control and concluded simply that "many Americans regard environmental quality
as an important national good that transcends individual or local interest." Stewart, supra note
53, at 210.
60. Community Environmental Response Facilitation Act of 1992, Pub. L.No. 102-426,
106 Stat. 2174 (codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 note, 9620 (1994)); Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 152-288,63 Stat. 378 (codified as amended

in scattered sections of 5, 40,41, 44 U.S.C.); Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L.No. 93205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.). For California
legislation, see Fort Ord Reuse Authority Act (1994), CAL GOV'T CODE §§ 67650-700 (West

1999).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 40

creating an uneven playing field if resources are not available for all
interests to participate meaningfully. At Fort Ord, citizen members of the
RAB frequently complained that they had no resources for the simplest
things, such as making copies of documents, let alone paying for external
technical assistance. Only recently has the U.S. Department of Defense
issued final rules to provide funds for technical assistance to community
members of a RAB.61 Not surprisingly, in other contexts, effective, local
citizen involvement and participation on land use issues in the regulatory
process have required significantly greater staff time and financial
resources than traditional, top-down approaches.'
V. SUMMARY
The case study on which this article rests, the Fort Ord Superfund
site near Monterey, California, richly portrays how local land use and its
amalgam of economic development pressures, local politics, planning,
competing social interests, and environmental resources can become
messily and unpredictably entwined with federal statutory cleanup
requirements and the institutions devised to manage cleanup. That local
land use policy is complex and prone to uncertain outcomes admittedly is
hardly new, but exposing the mixture is nonetheless instructive. In perhaps
taking the unruly pot of forces for granted and not acknowledging its
implication for local, cooperative based efforts to more rationally manage
federal environmental protection, the literature on Superfund cleanups
based on local land use considerations, as well as the devolution literature,
risks constructing a theoretically appealing vessel that is riddled with
pragmatic holes.
The lessons of Fort Ord vis-A-vis public involvement, regional
decision making, and the statutory and financial base for heightened local
involvement in decision making have analogs in other environmental
regulatory arenas. As suggested in the introduction, these same issues have
been identified as critical in a number of efforts that draw from the
devolutionary principles of increased local involvement in and cooperative
approaches to federal environmental decision making in the West and
elsewhere. Both positive and negative models of these efforts exist. Three
examples will suffice here.

61. See Technical Assistance Program FinallyLaunched, 5 MIL & ENVT 1 (1998).

62. See K. Allison Harem, The MassachusettsExperience with Nonpoint Sources: Regulators
Bew re!, NAT. RES

CES & ENV'T, Witer 1996, at 47; U.S GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB.
No.
GAO/RCED-96-200,
URBAN
TRANSPORTATION:
MErROPOLrTAN PLANNING
ORGANIzATIoNs' EFFoRTs To MEET FEDERAL PLANNING REQuEmEW (1996).
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First, and largely on the positive side, since 1991 federal transportalaw
has been reworked to give a broader public more central seats at
tion
the transportation planning table and metropolitan planning organizations
a bigger role in transportation decision making." The legislation has largely
been successful on the first score, particularly when transportationplanning entities commit financial resources to support participation.
However, substantial involvement from a broad public (that includes
minority and low-income groups) rather than just from directly affected
special interest groups continues to be a challenge. The broadening of the
authority of metropolitan planning organizations also has largely been
successful, although the delegation of authority to such organizations
remains contentious and may need further legislative changes."
Second, and less encouragingly, commentators have attacked the
flagship collaborative program of the USEPA, namely the Agency's Project
XL.This is a pilot program that allows regulated firms the opportunity to
seek waivers from existing and future regulatory requirements in return for
developing site-specific plans for greater environmental benefits. Critics
have argued that XL needs a stronger statutory base, both to withstand
possible legal challenges from citizen suits as well as to encourage more
participation from industry.' In addition, according to some, the process
of stakeholder involvement in XL has been weakened by lack of financial
support to non-industry stakeholders and, more generally, effective public
participation has been problematic. Industry apparently has been reluctant
to agree to legislation that would furnish prescriptive language for
stakeholder involvement."
Finally, the environmental community has expressed a number of
concerns with the habitat conservation planning process under the
Endangered Species Act.67 This process, which is provided for by existing

63. See Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, Pub. L No. 102-240,105
Stat. 1914 (codified in 49 U.S.C. § 101 note (1994)); Transportation Equity Act for the 21st
Century, Pub. L. No. 105-178,112 Stat. 107 (1998) (to be codified in scattered sections of 23
U.S.C.).
64. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFIcE, supra note 62, at 29.
65. See Rena L Steinzor, Reinventing Envinmmental Regulation: The Dangerouslourneyfrom
Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVL. L. REV. 103, 117, 14749 (1998); U.S. GENERAL
AccouNTING OFFICE, PUB.No. GAO/T-RCED-98-33, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: EPA'S
AND STATES FFORTS TO "REINVENT" ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (1998).
66. See generally U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO/RCED-97-155,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: CHALLENGES FACING EPA'S EFFORTS TO REIENT
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (1997); Stakeholder Involvement Remains Concern in Talks on
Alternative Compliance Plans, 27 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 229, at 229-30 (1996); Rena .Steinzor,
RegulatoryReinvention and Project XL Does the Emperor Have Any Clothes?, 26 ENVTL L REP.
NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,527,10,533 (1996).
67. Endangered Species Act of 1973,16 U.S.C. § 1539 (1994).
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language in the Act, provides a means by which the federal government
and private or other non-federal landowners reach an agreement that
authorizes the landowner(s) to disturb habitat in return for other conservation commitments. It thus represents an example of an effort to accommodate local development concerns within the strictures of a federal program.
Notwithstanding the explosion of interest in these plans over the last
several years, even supporters of the approach have articulated strong
concerns over the lack of broad public participation in the process and the
insufficiency of regulatory language under the Act for ensuring that the
habitat conservation plans do not endanger species survival.' Moreover,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon recently ruled it was illegal
under the Act for the federal regulating entity to rely on a state's promise
to protect imperiled salmon through an unenforceable collaborative,
voluntary approach with private landowners.'
It is important to emphasize that a traditional, centralized, and
highly coercive federal environmental approach by no means necessarily
would have avoided the problems identified in the Fort Ord case and these
latter two examples of devolved collaboration. Moreover, there is ample
evidence that centralized programs can be needlessly controversial, and
both costly and of dubious benefit to the natural environment. Therefore,
recasting many traditional top-down efforts to new processes where local
publics and the regulated entities have more opportunity to participate
meaningfully in decision making holds tremendous appeal. To that extent,
the apparently increasing interest in integrating hazardous waste cleanups
and other federal responsibilities with local land use in the West is on terra
firma.
At the same time, however, further integration pushes more deeply
into a terra incognita of shared federal and local responsibility for land use
and environmental program administration. Local land use already is a
complex social phenomenon, and few areas of local government administration have been skewered by charges of cronyism and corruption as have
local land use decisions. When coupled with federal environmental
responsibilities, property issues will cut across those of public health and
the boundaries of a problem will expand, as property law, risk assessment,
local zoning, federal regulations, statutory provisions, technical uncer-

68. See John Kostyack, Reshaping Habitat Conservation Plansfor Species Recovery: An
Introduction to a Series of Articles on HabitatConservationPlans, 27 ENVTL L. 755 (1997); John
Kostyack, Habitat Conservation Planning under the Endangered Species Act: Time to Give
Conservationistsand OtherConcme Citizens a Seat at the Table, ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE,
July/Aug. 1997, at 51.
69. See Michelle Nijhuis, Salmon Plan Can'tStand Alone, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Aug. 17,
1998, at 3. See also Carlotta Collette, Judge Nixes Salmon Plan, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Aug. 3,
1998, at 2.
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tainty, and the values of many publics all leave their mark on an environmental process that itself is open to considerable discretion.
The purpose of this article has been to challenge the political
rhetoric that drawing on local land use features and players in federal
environmental programs is a straightforward unencumbered process that
will result in improved environmental management. Competing local
interests, the existence of non-local stakeholders whose interests differ from
those of local residents, and weak statutory authority and funding militate
against the unfettered success of such a devolutionary approach. Unbridled
enthusiasm for greater local control over environmental management in
Superfund and elsewhere thus needs to be tempered with serious thought
about how to promote statutorily grounded, effective, broad-based, and
well-funded participation in the public interest. Perhaps most critically,
how can we create or encourage the creation of participatory institutions
that are at the center of decision making, institutions that can reach
decisions in a timely manner but be responsive to the diverse local and
supra-local interests and communities that constitute a pluralistic society?
An appreciation of the complexities of land use challenges
conventional thinking on the nexus of federal environmental programs and
local land use and economic development. As such, this article offers
generalized propositions that can play an important role in motivating,
enlarging, and informing policy debates about Superfund and other
national-level programs that shape the natural environment in the western
United States and throughout the country.

